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Recent Developments 
Holbrook v. State: 
Arson and Reckless Endangerment Do Not Have to be Merged at Sentencing 
Because They are Considered Separate Crimes 
In a case of first impression, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
reckless endangerment and arson are 
separate crimes for double jeopardy 
purposes and, therefore, do not have 
to be merged at sentencing. Holbrook 
v. State, 364 Md. 354, 772A.2d 1240 
(2001). The court further held 
Legislative intent was c1ear1hatpersons 
convicted of arson might also be 
convicted of reckless endangerment. 
Holbrook, the defendant, lived wi1h 
his girlfiiend and several of her family 
members at the residence that is the 
subject of this case. Following a 
physical altercation wi1h his girlfiiend, 
Holbrook was told to leave the home 
and not return. Holbrook returned to 
the home several times. When his 
girlfriend refused to talk to him, he 
1hreatened to "get all of1hem" orto "bwn 
the house down." On the day of the 
fire, Holbrook wentto the home to talk 
to his girlfriend. After being told she 
was not home, Holbrook loitered 
outside the residence for about 45 
minutes. Later that night, the house was 
set on fire. Holbrook was seen across 
the street from the home about ten 
minutes after 1he fire was discovered. 
The eight people inside the house 
escaped wi1hout injury. 
Holbrook was tried in a bench 
trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico 
County and was found guilty of one 
count of first-degree arson and eight 
counts of reckless endangennent. At 
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sentencing, Holbrook received thirty 
years for1he arson conviction, of which 
seven and one-half years were 
suspended. He was sentenced to five 
years forthe first reckless endangennent 
conviction, to run consecutive with the 
arson sentence. Holbrook received five 
years for each of the seven remaining 
reckless endangennent convictions, to 
run consecutive to the arson sentence, 
but concurrent to the first reckless 
endangerment sentence and to each 
other. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the trial court, and 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari and affinned. 
In reaching its decision, the 
court of appeals first examined legislative 
history to determine the Legislature's 
intent when drafting the reckless 
endangerment statute. Id. at 362,772 
A.2d 1246. The court found the statute 
was constructed for the purpose of 
"deterringtheconunissionofpotentially 
harmful conduct before an injury or 
death occurs." Id. at 366, 772 A.2d 
1247(citingStatev. Pagotto, 361 Md. 
528, 762 A.2d 97 (2000)). Because 
the intent ofthe statute was to prevent 
the commission of potentially hannful 
conduct, a defendant could be found 
guilty even ifno actual injury occurred. 
Id. The court determined it did not 
matter whether the accused intended his 
conductto create a substantial risk of 
injury or death. Id. at 367,772 A.2d 
1247. Reckless endangerment can be 
found if the act would have been seen 
as a gross departure from the standard 
of conduct that a law-abiding person 
would observe. Id. (citing Minor v. 
State, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 
(1992)). 
Next, the court examined the history 
of arson. [d. at 367, 772A.2d 1248. 
The statute evolved from the common 
law, which defined arson as the 
"malicious burning of the dwelling of 
another." [d. (citing Brown v. State, 
285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1968)). 
Today, the statute defines arson as 
''wi11ful1y or maliciously setting fire to or 
burning a dwelling or occupied 
structure, whether the property of the 
person or another." Id. (citing Md. 
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),Art. 27, 
§ 6(a)). "Willfully" is defined as an act 
that is done intentionally, knowingly, 
and purposefully. [d. at 369, 772A.2d 
1248. "Maliciously" is defined as an 
act done with the intent to harm a 
person or property. Id. To consider a 
structure a "dwelling," it must be setup 
forovemightaccommodations, although 
it is not necessary that the building 
actually be occupied at the time ofthe 
arson. [d. 
The court then looked at the 
required evidence test, which 
determines for double jeopardy 
pwposes whether the ctifferentoifenses, 
growing out of the same occurrence, 
should be merged and treated as the 
same offense. Id. at 370, 772 A.2d 
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1249. Under this test, if each offense 
contains at least one elementnecessaty 
to secure a conviction that the other 
does not, the offenses are not 
considered the same and merger need 
not occur to prevent double jeopardy. 
ld. (citing Williams v. State, 323 Md. 
312,593 A.2d 671 (1991)). 
In the instant case, arson and 
reckless endangerment each have one 
differing element; arson requires a 
defendant to act "willfully and 
"maliciously," while reckless 
endangerment requires a defendant to 
act "recklessly." TIlerefore, the two 
offenses do not merge. Id. at371, 772 
A.2d 1249. In discussing the difference 
between the elements of arson and 
reckless endangerment, the court 
reasoned the Legislature was clear in its 
definition of "malicious" and "willful" in 
the arson statute and it intended arson 
to be a specific intent crime. !d. at371, 
772 A.2d 1250. On the other hand, in 
view of the fact that reckless 
endangennent requires a person to 
consciously disregard any risk of harm 
to other people, the Legislature intended 
reckless endangerment to be a general 
intent clime. Id. Furthemlore, arson is 
a crime against habitation, whereas 
reckless endangemlent is a crime against 
people. ld. at 372, 772 A.2d 1250. 
As Holbrook was convicted and 
sentenced on two separate crimes, the 
court detennined there was no double 
jeopardy violation. Id. 373, 772A.2d 
1251. 
Finally, the court considered the rule 
oflenity, which requires that when there 
is doubt or ambiguity as to the legislative 
intent regarding multiple punishments for 
the same act, the conflict will be resolved 
against ''turning a single transaction into 
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multiple offenses." Id. (citing 
Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 593 
A.2d 671 (1991)). The purpose of 
this rule is to prevent courts from 
increasing the statutoty penalty when 
it is not certain how much punishment 
the Legislature intended. Id. Thecourt 
determined the Legislature worded 
the reckless endangerment statute to 
remove the ambiguity. Id. at 374, 
772A.2d 1251. 
In Holbrook v. State, the Court 
of Appeals ofMatyland held reckless 
endangerment and arson do not have 
to be merged for sentencing 
purposes because they are separate 
crimes. In the past, the general intent 
of reckless disregard for 
consequences was substituted for the 
specific intentrequiredto establish the 
mens rea element of arson. This is 
no longer the case. This ruling makes 
clear the importance of the protection 
of human life in our society. It also 
attempts to deter potentially harmful 
conduct by allowing for separate 
punishments for a single act, even if 
there are no injuries. 
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